Journal of Financial Crises
Volume 4

Issue 2

2022

France: Deposit Guarantee Fund
Ezekiel Vergara
Yale School of Management

Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises
Part of the Economic Policy Commons, Finance and Financial Management Commons,
Macroeconomics Commons, Policy Design, Analysis, and Evaluation Commons, Policy History, Theory,
and Methods Commons, and the Public Administration Commons

Recommended Citation
Vergara, Ezekiel (2022) "France: Deposit Guarantee Fund," Journal of Financial Crises: Vol. 4 : Iss. 2,
302-316.
Available at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/vol4/iss2/9

This Case Study is brought to you for free and open access by the Journal of Financial Crises and
EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. For more information, please contact
journalfinancialcrises@yale.edu.

France: Deposit Guarantee Fund1
Ezekiel Vergara2
Yale Program on Financial Stability Case Study
July 15, 2022
Abstract
In October 2008, during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), European Union (EU) officials
urged member states to raise their minimum deposit-insurance coverage to at least EUR
50,000 (USD 68,000) to promote confidence in banks. France did not need to increase its
deposit-insurance cap to meet this target, as it already guaranteed EUR 70,000. The following
year, EU officials passed a directive that required all member states to permanently increase
their minimum deposit-insurance coverage to EUR 100,000 by December 31, 2010. French
authorities complied with the EU’s directive on September 29, 2010. The Fonds de Garantie
des Dépôts (FGD), a private administrator, oversaw France’s deposit guarantee. Membership
was mandatory for all deposit-taking institutions, and they paid risk-based fees to the FGD.
The FGD covered most deposit types. As of February 2012, the FGD had not been activated
in response to any bank failures.
Keywords: account guarantees, European Union, France, Fonds de Garantie des Dépôts,
Global Financial Crisis

This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering account guarantee programs. Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/.
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Overview
During the Global Financial Crisis (GFC),
European Union (EU) authorities took a
number of measures to reassure markets
(IMF 2009a). On October 7, 2008, the EU’s
Economic and Financial Council urged
member states to increase their depositinsurance coverage to EUR 50,000 (USD
68,000) (EC 2008).3 The G-7 also adopted a
statement on October 10, 2008, urging
countries to have sound deposit-insurance
schemes (G-7 2008). This prompted several
European countries to increase their
deposit-insurance coverage.
However, France did not need to increase
its deposit-insurance cap to meet this
target, as it already guaranteed EUR 70,000
(FGD 2007c). The French government did
take other actions to promote financial
stability,
including
recapitalization
programs and refinancing operations (IMF
2010; Fang 2020; Jeffereis 2021). During
the early stages of the GFC, the French
government gave some indication that it
was willing to stand behind all deposits, but
such a guarantee was never codified (FSB
2012).

Key Terms
Purpose: To enhance confidence in the banking
system, compensate depositors, and comply with a
European Union directive
Launch Dates

Announcement:
September 29, 2010
Authorization:
September 29, 2010
Operation:
September 29, 2010

End Dates

Changes to the depositinsurance system adopted
permanently

Eligible
Institutions

All deposit-taking institutions
in France

Eligible Account(s)

A variety of deposit accounts
held in eligible institutions

Fees

Differed according to an
institution’s risk profile

Size of Guarantee

EUR 100,000

Coverage

USD 1.2 trillion in 2010

Outcomes

No failures as of February
2012

The Fonds de Garantie des Dépôts (FGD), a
Notable Features
The FDG was privately
private administrator, oversaw France’s
administered, though it was
deposit guarantee (FGD 2007g). The FGD
subject to a variety of public
also administered two other guarantees on
controls
4
securities and warranties (FGD 2007e).
The FGD was subject to public regulation
and controls. For instance, the FGD’s bylaws needed approval from public authorities (FSB
2012). Membership was mandatory for all deposit-taking institutions, and they paid fees to
the FGD. Fees varied according to the risk profile of individual banks. The FGD covered most
deposit types. It excluded foreign-currency deposits of states not part of the European
Economic Area (FGD 2007h).

On October 7, 2008, EUR 1 = USD 1.36, per Yahoo Finance.
The FGD defined guaranteed warranties as those “required by law or regulations undertaken by a credit
institution on behalf of individuals or legal entities under private law” (FGD 2007f).
3
4
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In March 2009, the EU adopted the October 2008 proposal as a directive, requiring all
member states to increase their deposit-insurance coverage first to EUR 50,000, and then to
EUR 100,000 by December 31, 2010 (EC n.d.; EP/EC 2009). To comply with the EU’s
directive, on September 29, 2010, French authorities increased the deposit-insurance limit
to EUR 100,000 (Republic of France 2010). This change was meant to be permanent. In 2010,
scholars reported that the FGD insured USD 1.2 trillion; they also reported that the FGD’s
deposit-insurance fund was valued at USD 2.5 billion (Demirgüç-Kunt, Kane, and Laeven
2014). In February 2012, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) reported that the FGD had not
been activated to address any bank failures to date (FSB 2012).
As of January 2022, the French deposit-insurance limit remained EUR 100,000 (FGDR n.d.).
Legislation passed in 2013 converted the FGD into the Fonds de Garantie des Dépôts et de
Résolution (FGDR), granting the FGD greater resolution powers (FSB 2013).
Summary Evaluation
In light of the GFC, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) recommended that EU member
states harmonize and improve their deposit-insurance systems (IMF 2008; IMF 2009a). The
IMF praised France in 2009 for supporting these efforts (IMF 2009b).
The IMF, however, said that the FGD’s funds were limited compared to the deposits it insured
(IMF MCMD 2013). The IMF thus recommended gradually increasing the FGD’s funding and
establishing a pre-agreed financing backup in case other avenues of funding were
unavailable. The IMF also criticized the FGD for not having rules governing the speed of
reimbursement. It also said that having private bankers on the FGD’s governance board
could create conflicts of interest and might make government authorities hesitant to inform
the FGD about potential interventions. To alleviate these concerns, the IMF recommended
taking action to reduce the conflict of interest and formalized information-sharing
arrangements with French authorities.
In 2012, the FSB recommended that France conduct simulation exercises to ensure payout
readiness, given that the FGD had not been activated (FSB 2012). In 2019, the IMF reported
that the FGDR had developed procedures to fulfill its mandate and test its payout readiness
(IMF MCMD 2019). The IMF also suggested peacetime activities to ensure a speedy payout,
including harmonizing information technology systems between banks and the FGD, among
others. In a 2013 report, the FSB praised the FGD as largely compliant with the International
Association of Deposit Insurers’ (IADI) recommendations (FSB 2013).
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Context: France 2009–2010

GDP
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU
converted to USD)
GDP per capita
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU
converted to USD)

$2.7 trillion in 2009
$2.6 trillion in 2010
$41,575 in 2009
$40,638 in 2010
Data for 2009:
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA
Fitch: AAA

Sovereign credit rating
(five-year senior debt)

Size of banking system
Size of banking system
as a percentage of GDP
Size of banking system
as a percentage of financial system
Five-bank concentration of banking system
Foreign involvement in banking system
Government ownership of banking system
Existence of deposit insurance

Data for 2010:
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA
Fitch: AAA
$3.1 trillion in 2009
$3.0 trillion in 2010
113.4% in 2009
114.2% in 2010
Data not available for 2009
Data not available for 2010
75.6% in 2009
76.9% in 2010
6% in 2009
15% in 2010
Data not available for 2009
Data not available for 2010
Yes, in 2009
Yes, in 2010

Sources: Bloomberg; World Bank Global Financial Development Database; World
Bank Deposit Insurance Dataset.
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Key Design Decisions
1. Purpose: France did not change its deposit-insurance limit in 2008 but did so in
2010 to comply with a European Union directive and to remain competitive with
other countries.
In response to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), on October 7, 2008, the European Union
(EU)’s Economic and Financial Council urged member states to increase their depositinsurance coverage to EUR 50,000 (EC 2008). Many EU member states increased their
deposit-insurance coverage in response to this guidance (IMF 2009a).
France’s deposit-insurance cap was already at EUR 70,000, and it did not change that cap in
response to the EU’s recommendation (IMF 2009b). On October 3, 2008, during a speech to
the ruling Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) party, then prime minister François Fillon
indicated that the French government was willing to guarantee all deposits, but such a
guarantee was never codified or took effect (FSB 2012; Willard 2008).
In March 2009, the EU adopted the October 2008 proposal as a directive, requiring all
member states to increase their deposit-insurance minimums first to EUR 50,000, and then
to EUR 100,000 by December 31, 2010 (EC n.d.; EP/EC 2009). To comply with this directive,
on September 29, 2010, French authorities increased their deposit-insurance coverage to
EUR 100,000 (Republic of France 2010). French authorities reported to the Financial
Stability Board (FSB) that the change was also a response to competitive international
pressures arising from other jurisdictions that had increased their deposit-insurance
coverage (FSB 2012).
2. Part of a Package: The French government took several measures to promote
financial stability during the GFC.
The French government took several measures to promote financial stability during the GFC.
Following the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, French officials placed
Lehman’s French subsidiary under state administration (IMF 2009b). The government
established a capital-injection program and cooperated with Belgium and Luxembourg to
recapitalize and guarantee Dexia, a systemically important bank (Jeffereis 2021). A bankrefinancing program was also created with the goal of maintaining market liquidity (Fang
2020).
3. Legal Authority: In 2010, French authorities adopted a bylaw to increase the
Fonds de Garantie des Dépôts’s coverage limit.
The Fonds de Garantie des Dépôts (FGD) was created on June 25, 1999, according to Article
L. 312-4 of the Monetary and Financial Code (FGD 2007g). The Monetary and Financial Code
laid out the structure of the FGD (FGD 2007e). Further regulations were adopted in 1999,
which established the maximum amount of compensation, payout terms and conditions, and
the specifics of the FGD’s financial resources (FGD 2007h; FGD 2007i).
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On March 11, 2009, the European Parliament and the European Council passed 2009/14/EC,
which required all EU member states to increase their deposit-insurance coverage to EUR
100,000 by December 31, 2010 (EP/EC 2009). France complied with the directive on
September 29, 2010, when minister of the economy, finance, and industry Christine Lagarde
issued a bylaw, a ministerial decree that is not subject to legislative involvement (Republic
of France 2010; Republic of France 2018). The bylaw raised the coverage level to EUR
100,000.
4. Administration: The FGD, a private administrator, administered France’s deposit
guarantee. The FGD could receive consultations from public authorities.
The French Monetary and Financial Code established the FGD. The FGD, however, was
privately administered (FSB 2013). It was subject to public regulation and control, including
the establishment of the FGD’s deposit-insurance limit (FSB 2012). The FGD’s internal rules
required approval from the French minister of the economy, finance, and industry. These
internal rules were of particular importance in establishing the legal operating procedures
of the FGD, which the Monetary and Financial Code left up to the FGD’s supervisory board
(FGD 2007e; FGD 2007g).
The supervisory board oversaw the deposit-insurance fund, setting its regulations and
policies, which were then approved by the minister of the economy, finance, and industry
(FGD 2007g). The supervisory board approved the FGD’s accounts and appointed auditors.
The supervisory board was a 12-member board, with four members representing credit
institutions, two members representing banking institutions tied to the state, and six
members representing non-credit institutions. The supervisory board’s decisions were
passed by a simple majority vote. The voting rights of each member depended on the
financial contributions that each class of institutions made to the FGD, with credit
institutions having more voting power than other institutions. The Financial Audit Office
could also audit the FGD.
The management board was a three-member body, whose chairman was appointed by the
supervisory board and the minister of the economy, finance, and industry (FGD 2007g). The
management board submitted the FGD’s financial statements and set out the communication
procedures for member institutions (FGD 2007e).
The FGD could receive consultations from various individuals, including the minister of the
economy, finance, and industry and the governor of the Banque de France.
The FGD could not trigger the exercise of its guarantee. That was the responsibility of the
banking regulator—then the Commission Bancaire, today the Autorité de Contrôle
Prudentiel et de Résolution (ACPR) (FSB 2013; FGD 2007b). Once the relevant authority
triggered the FGD’s exercise, the FGD would receive depositor data.5

5 The ACP was created in January 2010 as an independent administrative authority operative under the Banque

de France (ACP 2010). The ACP merged various institutions, including the French Commission Bancaire (ACP
2010). It is now the Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel et de Résolution (ACPR) (ACPR 2017a; ACPR 2017b).
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5. Governance: The FGD was subject to public control by the minister of the economy,
finance, and industry, and earlier, the banking and finance committee.
Prior to August 2003, the banking and finance committee, along with the minister of the
economy, finance, and industry, exercised oversight functions over the FGD (FGD 2007e;
Jeulin n.d.). The banking and finance committee was replaced on August 1, 2003, by the
banking and financial regulation advisory committee, which provided opinions on draft texts
before their adoption. The minister of the economy, finance, and industry, with advice from
the banking and financial regulation advisory committee, was responsible for determining
the maximum level of compensation for depositors, the rules governing payouts, annual fees,
and the appointment procedure for the supervisory board (FGD 2007g).
6. Communication: French authorities communicated that the increase in the
deposit-insurance limit was a response to the EU’s directive and to ensure
international competitiveness. The FGD utilized various communication
mechanisms, including a website and written information.
French authorities communicated to the Financial Stability Board (FSB) that the increase in
the FGD’s deposit-insurance cap was a response to the EU’s directive and competitive
international pressures. The FSB also highlighted that the FGD communicated with
depositors through multiple channels, including through its website, oral and written
information, and information provided by banks. Though never implemented, in October
2008, the French government signaled that it was willing to back all deposits (FSB 2012;
Willard 2008).
7. Size of Guarantees: The FGD guaranteed EUR 100,000 per depositor per
institution, starting September 29, 2010.
Prior to September 29, 2010, the FGD guaranteed up to EUR 70,000 per depositor per eligible
institution (FGD 2007c). However, an EU directive in March 2009 required all member states
to increase their deposit-insurance cap to EUR 100,000 by December 31, 2010 (EP/EC
2009). France issued a bylaw on September 29, 2010, effective immediately, to comply with
this directive, increasing deposit-insurance coverage to EUR 100,000 (Republic of France
2010).
By year-end 2010, the FGD had EUR 2 billion in assets, roughly equivalent to 0.2% of its total
covered deposits. Scholars estimated that this fund was used to cover USD 1.2 trillion in
deposits (Demirgüç-Kunt, Kane, and Laeven 2014).6 IMF officials predicted that, following
EU guidance on deposit-insurance, the fund would increase its target level significantly, to
between EUR 8 billion and EUR 10 billion (IMF MCMD 2013).
By year-end 2017, the FGDR had EUR 3.6 billion in assets for deposit coverage, with a target
ratio of 0.5% of covered deposits (IMF MCMD 2019). The FGDR also had a credit backstop
from a seven-bank syndicate for EUR 1.4 billion, allowing it to meet its target fund ratio.
6 According

to the IMF’s estimates, the FGD covered EUR 952.4 billion at year-end 2010 (IMF MCMD 2013).
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During the early stages of the GFC, the French government gave some indication that it was
willing to guarantee all deposits, but such a guarantee was never codified or took effect (FSB
2012).
8. Source(s) and Size of Funding: The FGD was funded through fees levied on
member institutions. The FGD could also invest its funds and levy additional fees.
The FGD’s deposit-insurance fund was primarily funded through fees paid by member
institutions (FGD 2007g). Fees varied according to the risk profile of individual banks. The
FGD could invest its deposit-insurance funds in a wider set of products, compared to other
deposit-insurance agencies, which could only invest in government or central bank
instruments (FSB 2012).
As backup sources of funding, the FGD could borrow money or levy additional premiums on
member institutions (FGD 2007g; FGD 2007i). The FGD did not have a government-funding
backstop (IMF MCMD 2013). In 2010, scholars reported that the FGD’s fund was valued at
USD 2.5 billion (Demirgüç-Kunt, Kane, and Laeven 2014). This fund was used to cover USD
1.2 trillion in deposits.
9. Eligible Institutions: Membership in the FGD was mandatory for all deposit-taking
institutions in France, expect foreign institutions covered by a guarantee in their
respective domicile country.
Membership in the FGD was mandatory for all licensed deposit-taking institutions in France
(FGD 2007g). Branches of foreign credit institutions not covered by a guarantee in their
country of domicile were also required to join the FGD. Foreign bank branches that received
coverage in their domicile country could also receive supplementary coverage from the FGD
by way of an agreement with the FGD (FGD 2007j). French branches operating in foreign
countries could receive coverage from the FGD insofar as they did not receive coverage from
another state.
By year-end 2010, the FGD insured 651 deposit-taking institutions (IMF MCMD 2013).
10. Eligible Accounts: The FGD covered most deposit types, except some foreigncurrency deposits.
According to Article L. 312-4 of the Monetary and Financial Code, the FGD covered deposits
(FGD 2007g). French regulation defined “deposits” as “credit balance resulting from funds
left in an account or from temporary situations deriving from normal banking transactions
which a credit institution must repay under the legal and contractual conditions applicable,
particularly in clearing arrangements” (FGD 2007h). The FGD’s guarantee excluded deposits
held by other credit institutions, insurance companies, and investment companies.
French Regulation 99-05 also excluded deposits in currencies others than those of member
states in the EU. The guarantee did not cover debt securities.
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11. Fees (A): The FGD charged fees to eligible institutions, which varied according to
each institution’s respective risk profile.
The FGD was funded by fees levied on eligible institutions (FGD 2007g). These fees varied
according to the institution’s respective risk profile, which was determined by the minister
of the economy, finance, and industry. French regulation stipulated that these fees could not
endanger the stability of the banking system and that institutions needed to pay their fees in
a single installment (FGD 2007i).
Fees (B): The FGD could levy additional fees if necessary. Additional fees were
levied in 2010.
If the FGD’s obligations exceeded its funding, the FGD could levy additional fees on FGDinsured institutions (FGD 2007i). While the FGD was not activated, the FGD did levy these
additional fees (FSB 2012; IMF MCMD 2013). To cope with the coverage increase from
September 2010, the FGD levied EUR 270 million in fees to ensure that its funds were not
depleted. Member institutions paid this fee in three annual installments.
12. Process for Exercising Guarantee: The FGD would be activated if an institution
could not meet redemptions or was at risk of not meeting its redemptions, or if
French authorities asked the FGD to intervene. French regulation required the
FGD to complete all payouts within two months, though the FGD could request an
additional four-month extension.
The French Monetary and Financial Code set out three conditions under which the FGD
would be activated: if the Commission Bancaire, or later the ACPR, determined that an
eligible institution was no longer able to meet its redemptions; if the Commission Bancaire
determined that an institution was at a high risk of being unable to fulfill its redemptions; or
if a national body—namely, commercial courts—asked the FGD to assume the costs
associated with maintaining the solvency of an institution (FGD 2007b; FGD 2007g). The FGD
could not refuse to intervene when called upon (FGD 2007a).
Once the FGD’s exercise had been triggered, the FGD would receive depositor and prudential
information, usually immediately (FSB 2012; FGD 2007b). The FGD would then send a letter
to all of the institution’s depositors explaining the procedures and rules governing the FGD’s
exercise. The FGD would identify the depositors who required compensation and inform
depositors of their respective amounts. The depositor could either accept the FGD’s
compensation or contest the compensation within 15 days. The FGD would then pay out
depositors, either by bank transfer or check. The FGD would liquidate the failed institution
and utilize these funds to repay the deposit-insurance fund (FGD 2007g; FGD 2007d). The
FGD could also take legal action against a failed institution’s executives to secure some or all
of the repaid funds.
The FGD’s payout process usually lasted 20 to 30 days (FSB 2012). French regulation
required the FGD to repay depositors within a two-month period, though the FGD could
request an additional extension of up to four months (FGD 2007b).
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13. Other Restrictions on Eligible Institutions/Accounts: There were no additional
conditions associated with the FGD’s guarantee.
Other than fees, there were no additional conditions associated with the FGD’s guarantee.
14. Duration: The changes to the deposit-insurance system were adopted as
permanent changes.
The changes to the French deposit-insurance cap were adopted as permanent changes
(Republic of France 2010; FSB 2012). As of January 2022, the French deposit-insurance limit
remains EUR 100,000 (FGDR n.d.). In 2013, French authorities passed legislation to convert
the FGD into the Fonds de Garantie des Dépôts et de Résolution (FGDR), granting the FGD
greater resolution powers (FSB 2013).
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